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Notes

NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: A SOLUTION
TO THE CURRENT INADEQUACIES OF
THE FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES
It is annoying to be honest to no purpose.'
Ovid
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perjury is a flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 2
The fairness of the forum and the substantive justness of the law cannot
overcome the debilitating effects of false testimony. Indeed, no other crime
frustrates the judicial process' overriding goal, the attainment of truth, more
than perjury.
The social interest in the integrity of sworn statements in judicial
proceedings is well-recognized.3 Because many perjury law concepts remain
unchanged, perjury's history is a living memorial to its past.4 Perjury was
limited to false oaths in judicial proceedings under the common law.' Penalties

1. 2 OVID, Ex PoNTo, ch. 3 (translation of gratispaenitet esse probum).
2. Cate Gillen et al., Project, Sixth Survey of White Collar Crime: Perjury, 28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 619 (1991). Perjury is a witness' knowingly false assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion,
belief, or knowledge, in a judicial proceeding upon oath that is material to the issue of inquiry.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1139 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See generally ROLUIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 453 (1969) (giving a history of perjury).
4. Stephen J. Arlington, Comment, An Analysis of New York's Perjury Law, 40 ALB. L. REV.
198, 199 (1975).
5. SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 163 (1797) [hereinafter THIRD INSTITUTE]; 4 WKIAM
BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARiES *137 [hereinafter COMMENTARIES].

It has been said, "Blackstone to the contrary notwithstanding, the perjury of witnesses was not
punishable at common law." Charles P. Curtis, Jr. & Richard C. Curtis, The Story ofa Notion in
the Law of Ciminal Contempt, 41 HARv. L. REv. 51, 59 (1927). The Curtis' based this statement
on a misinterpretation of a quotation from Stephen. 3 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF

THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 241 (1883). Stephen's reference is to common law "in early
times." Id. at 243. Stephen mentions that the Star Chamber considered a 1487 statute (3 Hen. 7
c.1) to have "authorized them to punish perjury." Id. at 244. This statute punished the offense as
a crime. Stephen adds, "The present law upon this subject ... originated entirely as far as I can
judge in the decisions by Court of Star Chamber." Id. at 245.
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for a convicted perjurer ranged from cutting out the tongue to death. 6
Presently, sections 1621 and 1623 of Title 18 of the United States Code
define perjury before federal tribunals.7 Section 1621 codifies common law
perjury8 and encompasses statements made under oath "before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person." 9 Congress enacted section 1623 in 1970 as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act,'" to encompass false statements made in
proceedings before, or ancillary to, a United States court or grand jury." The
most significant difference between these statutes is that a retraction bars section
1623 prosecution, but not section 1621 prosecution. 2 A retraction defense's
existence may influence prosecutors to apply section 1621 to avoid successful
defenses to perjury charges. The goal of section 1623's limited retraction
defense is to encourage truthful testimony "by permitting [the witness]
voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk [of] prosecution
by doing so."1 3 The differences in the statutes, however, defeat this goal.
Specifically, the problem is that witnesses are charged with perjury under
section 1621-the general perjury statute-when a retraction exists, but section
1623-the formal proceedings perjury statute-when a retraction does not
exist.' 4 Consequently, a perjurer may be prosecuted under section 1621 despite
Congress' desire to encourage truthful testimony by providing section 1623's
defense.' 5 Thus, the current statutory scheme frustrates Congress' express
goals because a potentially penitent perjurer will be hesitant to retract a false
declaration made before a court or grand jury knowing section 1621 prosecution
exists.
An example demonstrates the inadequacies of the federal perjury statutes.
Suppose the prosecutor asks a witness in a federal grand jury indictment if the
witness knows the defendant under investigation. The declarant knowingly and
willfully denies knowing the accused, whose character is at issue in the

6. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, *132 (citing THIRD INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at 163).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 addresses subordination of perjury, but is beyond this note's scope.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). Section 1621 has remained virtually unchanged since the first
perjury statute was passed in 1790. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 18, 1 Stat. 116 (1790).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
10. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IV, 84 Stat. 927.
Legislative history indicates that § 1623 was intended to ameliorate § 1621's obstacles, and thereby
enhance the reliability before federal courts. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4023-24 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) provides a limited retraction defense. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 omits a
retraction defense.
13. See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48.
14. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
15. Id.
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proceedings.
Before the prosecutor asks another question, the declarant voluntarily
retracts the prior testimony because she recognized the accused's name and face
from when they attended elementary school together. The proceedings continue
without incident following this retraction. After resolving the defendant's case,
the prosecutor indicts the declarant on perjury charges although the voluntary
retraction was harmless to the proceedings. Thus, the prosecutor manipulates
the statutes by charging the declarant with section 1621 perjury.
This manipulation perverts legislative intent. Legislative history indicates
that Congress' primary objective was to encourage truthful testimony by
permitting a witness to correct a false statement without incurring the risk of
prosecution. t6 The Second Circuit has recognized that although Congress
constitutionally could have given the prosecutor such broad discretion, legislative
history indicates otherwise.' 7
The Sixth Circuit has even gone so far as to assume, without deciding, that
section 1623's retraction defense applies to section 1621 prosecutions.'"
Nevertheless, courts are unable to prevent this circumvention of congressional
intent because of the wording of the statutes. Consequently, Congress should
enact a single perjury statute that includes a retraction defense. A single statute
would solve the current inadequacies of the federal perjury statutes and adhere
to Congress' intent.
This Note addresses the inadequacies inherent in the federal perjury statutes
caused by the availability of a retraction defense in section 1623 perjury
prosecutions and the unavailability of a defense in section 1621 prosecutions.
In Section II, this Note briefly analyzes the recent history of perjury
prosecutions.' 9 This analysis demonstrates the increasing availability of
retraction defenses and reveals the legislative intent behind the statutes. In
Section I, this Note analyzes the current status of the federal perjury statutes
2
and examines the elements, differences, and defenses of each statute.m

16. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 150 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT]; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 47-48.
17. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.

The Second Circuit "admitted great

skepticism about the second half of the government's argument. While perhaps Congress
constitutionally could have placed such wide discretion inthe prosecutor, we find no clear indication
that it meant to do so here." United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 982 (1973).
18. See United States v. Tucker, 586 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library) (assuming that a retraction defense may be appropriate under § 1621).
19. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-170 and accompanying text.
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This Note, in Section IV, scrutinizes the problematic areas of the perjury
statutes. This analysis concludes that the pejury statutes discourage truthful
testimony, thereby frustrating the entire judicial process' goals.2 Section IV
also reveals how prosecutors use the statutes to circumvent legislative intent.
Finally, this Note, in Section V, offers a single statute that remedies these
problematic areas.'
The model statute solves these problems because
declarants will be more willing to correct false declarations with honest
testimony knowing a conditional defense is available.
II. AN HIsTOmicAL ANALYSIS OF PERJURED TESTIMONY
A. Supreme Court Precedent
The first case that the United States Supreme Court decided regarding the
availability of a retraction defense concerned the common law perjury statute.
In United States v. Norris,' Senator George W. Norris was charged with
violating the general perjury statute.74 The issue was whether retraction
neutralizes previous false testimony so that a perjury witness may be
exculpated.'
The Court held that the crime is complete regardless of

21. See infra notes 171-206 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
23. 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
24. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 570 (1937). Senator Norris was charged under what
is now 18 U.S.C. § 1621, but what was then 18 U.S.C. § 23 1. Id. at 570 n.4. He denied, during
a congressional investigation, receiving financial backing for his political campaign. Id. at 569-70.
He gave the following testimony before a committee empowered to investigate campaign
expenditures:
Q. Now what assurance did you have of financial support and backing?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. In your campaign?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. Did you ever get any assurance from anybody that they would help
you-Repubican, Democrat, independents, or anybody say they would help finance
your campaign?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you receive any money from anybody in the campaign?
A. I did not.
Id. at 568-70. The following day, after a witness testified to the contrary, Senator Norris admitted
"that he had received $500 and $50 and that what he was saying was not true." Id. at 570-71.
25. Id. at 568. In addressing this issue the Court sought to settle an important question. Id.
See Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577, 582 (8th Cir. 1935); Johnsenv. United States, 41 F.2d
44, 46 (9th Cir. 1930); Er parte Keizo Shibata, 35 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1929); Er pane Chin Chan
On, 32 F.2d 828 (W.D. Wa. 1929); Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1926).
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subsequent retraction once a false statement is made under oath.

6

Senator

26. Norris, 300 U.S. at 574-76. The Court stated that "[d]eliberate material falsification under
oath constitutes pejury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made."
Id. at 574. The Court rejected the defense for fear that a retraction defense might encourage a
witness to swear falsely. Id. The Court reasoned that a retraction defense ignores the requirement
that the witness initially disclose the truth. Id.
The Court subsequently adhered to the two witness rule in Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S.
606 (1945). Two independent sources must attest to a statement's falsity in § 1621 prosecutions.
The two sources may be either two witnesses, or one witness and any independent corroborative
source, including the defendant's conduct, or documents ascribed by the defendant. See United
States v. Maultasch, 596 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining that two-witness rule is satisfied
where two witnesses testify as to two different transactions); United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266,
270 (7th Cir.) (noting that evidence of three witnesses was corroborated by fourth witness), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977); see also, United States v. DeLeon, 474 F.2d 790, 792 (5th Cir.)
(noting that police officer's testimony and traffic ticket satisfied rle), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 853
(1973). CQ.United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1840) (convicting defendant of perjury
for swearing to invoice's truth that was shown false by defendant's letters and invoice book); Allen
v. United States, 194 F. 664, 668 (4th Cir. 1912) (explaining that where no witness testified directly
on falsity and defendant made so signed statement, perjury conviction reversed); United States v.
Spaeth, 152 F. Supp. 216, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (noting that altered dates in defendant's
appointment book and on client's medical card sufficiently corroborated evidence), aff'd 254 F.2d
924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 83 (1958).
The corroborative source need not be sufficient in itself to prove perjury, but must suffice
when combined with the witness' testimony. See United States v. Howard, 445 F.2d 821, 822 (9th
Cir. 1971) (reversing defendant's conviction because corroborative evidence insufficient to
substantiate witness' testimony). The corroborative source must have independent probative value,
and must be inconsistent with the accused's innocence. See United States v. Forrest, 639 F.2d 1224,
1226 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that evidence must be of quality to assure guilty verdict solidly
founded); United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1226 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that evidence
devoid of meaning without witness' testimony and thus should not have been submitted to a jury as
corroborative); see also Cuesta v. United States, 230 F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1956) (requiring
corroboration of defendant's false statement admission for perjury conviction).
Two sources who are both witnesses need not corroborate one another. See United States v.
Maultasch, 596 F.2d at 25-26 (explaining that independent witness' testimony regarding separate
transaction sufficiently shows falsity of defendant's statements to SEC under two-witness rle).
Compare United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that when
defendant denied any transaction, two witnesses' testimony on separate transactions satisfied twowitness rule) with United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d at 1225-26 (noting that conviction on one
transaction reversed when witness testified as to two transactions but only one corroborated).
The prosecution must prove the statement's falsity and that its falsity is susceptible to proof.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1988); see also United States v. Howard, 445 F.2d 821, 822 (explaining
that government must supply evidence corroborative of direct evidence of defendant's perjury);
Kolaski v. United States, 362 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that perjurious statement's truth
or falsity must be open to proof).
In Weiler, the trial judge refused to charge that falsity must be proved by either two witnesses
or by one witness and corroborating circumstances. W6iler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 607-08
(1945). The Court of Appeals affirmed reasoning that the trial court should determine whether the
necessary corroboration was supplied. Id. at 608. The Supreme Court noted that other circuits had
held that charges similar to the one requested in Weiler should be given. Id. See Allen v. United
States, 194 F. 664, 668 (4th Cir. 1912).
However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that
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Norris would have also been guilty of perjury had section 1623's retraction
defense been available because his retraction did not occur until after it was
obvious the falsity would be exposed. Thus, the Supreme Court's only ruling
on retraction defenses involved perjury that failed to meet section 1623's limited
retraction requirements.
B. Treatment of Unsettled Aspects of Perjury in the Lower Federal Courts
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case regarding section
1623's retraction defense, the lower federal courts have struggled with the
difficult issues created by the two statutes. In United States v. Kahn,7' the
defendant was convicted, inter alia, of section 1621 perjury for false grand jury
testimonies.2' The defendant argued that he should have been prosecuted under
section 1623," because a statute aimed at specific conduct prevails over a
generally applicable statute.' The government argued, however, that because

corroboration questions are for the jury. Weiler, 323 U.S. at 610. The Court reasoned that this
result encompasses the two witness rule's purpose: to bar a jury from convicting for perjury on a
single witness' uncorroborated oath. Id. at 611. The two witness rule's justification was stated as
follows:
Since equally honest witnesses may well have different recollections of the same event,
we cannot reject as wholly unreasonable the notion that a conviction for pejury ought
not to rest entirely upon an oath against an oath. The rule may originally have stemmed
from quite different reasoning, but implicit in its evolution has been the fear that
innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in perjury prosecutions if a
less stringent rule were adopted.
Id. at 609.
27. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
28. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
29. Id.
30. The defendant relied on cases holding that prosecutions are improperly brought under the
general statute when special statutes applied. Id. at 283. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 125 (1904). Cases the defendant cited specifically found perjury prosecutions improperly
brought under the general statute when special perjury statutes were available. See Shelton v. United
States, 165 F.2d 241,244 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The defendant claimed that § 1623 would have barred
prosecution. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982
(1973).
The court found that because, like Norris, it had become manifest that the defendant's falsity
would be exposed, the defendant was not prejudiced, even if the government named the wrong
statute. Id. at 283-84. The court reasoned that because the substantive elements were the same
under either statute, the defendant got his due, if not more, on the evidence. Id. at 283. The court
supported its finding with numerous cases. See United States v. Huteheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229
(1941); United States v. Nixon, 235 U.S. 231 (1914); Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382
(1897); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 981 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Clizer, 464
F.2d 121, 124-25 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied sub nom, Carminati v. United States, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); United States v. McKnight,
253 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1958). The court further reasoned, because § 1623(d) states that an
admission of a prior declaration's falsity "shall bar prosecution," retraction defense's availability
should be raised before trial and then judicially disposed of. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272,
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section 1623 supplements, not supplants, section 1621, a defendant with a
successful section 1623(d) defense could be prosecuted for section 1621
perjury 2 ' Leaving the issue unresolved, the court was concerned with "the
prospect of the government employing section 1621 when . . . a retraction
exists, and section 1623 when one does not, simply to place perjury defendants
in the most disadvantageous trial position." 32
In United States v. Swainson, 3 the defendant was charged with section
1621 perjury although the offense occurred before a grand jury.34 The
defendant argued that the section 1621 charge abused prosecutorial discretion
because it denied section 1623's retraction defense.3' The Sixth Circuit, like
the Second Circuit in Kahn,3' upheld the conviction because he would have
been convicted under either section of the statute.3 7 The Sixth Circuit, in
United States v. Tucker,3' went one step further in assuming, without deciding,
that a retraction defense may be appropriate under section 1621, just as it would

273 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 98 (1973).
31. Kahn, 472 F.2d at 283. The court questioned, however, whether Congress intended to give
prosecutors such wide discretion in choosing the charge and level of proof needed to convict. Id.
32. Id.
33. 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
34. United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 659-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937
(1977).
35. Id. at 663. The court, however, did not decide the issue because it was brought in a posttrial motion. Id. The court's decision rested on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)'s
provisions: "(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution; or
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment. . . must be raised prior to trial."
Id. Because the facts concerning the defendant's two appearances before the grand jury were known
before trial, the defendant must timely assert that the prosecution was barred by reason of his alleged
retraction. Id.
The defendant also argued that § 1623's legislative history requires prosecution under its
terms, rather than § 1621, when possible. Id. The defendant contended that § 1621 concerns
perjury generally, whereas § 1623 is limited to perjury in connection with court or grand jury
proceedings, indicating Congress' intent to use § 1623 for allegedly false statements to a grand jury.
Id. The court rejected the claim that § 1623's plain language shows Congress' intent to apply it to
all grand jury proceedings. Id. The court noted that Congress did not repeal § 1621 when it
enacted § 1623, and did not specify that § 1623 became the exclusive basis for perjury prosecutions
involving grand jury proceedings. Id.
36. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283-84 (2d Cir.) (noting that it had become
manifest that the falsity would be exposed, so § 1623(d)'s defense was unavailable to the defendant
even if he would have been charged under that statute), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
37. The defendant contended he would have been immune to § 1623(d)'s prosecution. United
States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). The defendant
relied on his second grand jury appearance as a bar to § 1623's prosecution. Id. The court
reasoned that, nevertheless, § 1623(d) would not have precluded perjury prosecution because when
the retraction was made, it was manifest that such falsity would be exposed. Id. (citing United
States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283-84; cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973)).
38. 586 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
982 (1979).
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be under section 1623. 3'
In United States v. Moore,'° the District of Columbia Circuit, through
Judge Spottswood Robinson, emphasized that the overriding goal of the federal
perjury statutes is to encourage truthful testimony. 4' Judge Robinson concluded
that Congress wanted to induce truthful testimony by permitting a witness to
voluntarily correct a false statement without incurring the risk of prosecution. 2
Although federal courts have struggled with the problems created by these
statutes, state statutes have eliminated such problems by adopting single perjury
statutes.
C. Treatment of Perjury Statutes by the Model Penal Code and
State Legislatures
The Model Penal Code concludes that a declarant is not guilty of perjury
if he retracts a statement during the proceeding, before it became manifest that
the falsification would be exposed, and before it affected the proceeding.43

39. United States v. Tucker, 586 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979). The defendant was convicted of § 1621's knowingly
giving a false statement under oath with the intent to deceive. Id. The defendant's primary
argument was § 1623's retraction defense applies to § 1621 perjury. Id. The court, as in Kahn and
Swainson, did not decide the issue because the retraction occurred under a threat that the falsity
would be exposed. Id.
40. 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
41. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1041-43 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
954 (1980).
42. Id. at 1041 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 150; HOUSE REPORT, supranote 10,
at 47-48).
43. Article 241.1 states:
(1) Offense defined. A person is guilty of perjury, a felony of the third degree,
if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent
affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the
statement is material and he does not believe it to be true.
(2) Materiality. Falsification is material, regardless of the admissibility of the
statement under the rules of evidence, if it could have affected the course or outcome
of the proceeding. It is no defense that the declarant mistakenly believed the
falsification to be immaterial. Whether a falsification is material in a given factual
situation is a question of law.
(3) IrregularitiesNo Defense. It is not a defense to prosecution under this Section
that the oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that the
declarant was not competent to make the statement. A document purporting to be made
upon oath or affirmation at any time when the actor presents it as being so verified shall
be deemed to have been duly sworn or affirmed.
(4) Retraction. No person shall be guilty of an offense under this Section if he
Tetracted the falsification in the course of the proceeding in which it was made before
it became manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed and before the
falsification substantially affected the proceeding.
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Numerous states have adopted retraction defenses similar to the Model Penal
Code." Aware of the increasing statutory recognition of retraction defenses
and the benefits of such defenses, Congress enacted section 1623 and based the
retraction defense on the New York perjury statute.'o

(5) Inconsistent Statements. Where the defendant made inconsistent statements
under oath or equivalent affirmation, both having been made within the period of the
statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsistent
statements in a single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false and
not believed by the defendant. In such cases it shall not be necessary for the
prosecution to prove which statement was false but only that one or the other was false
and not believed by the defendant to be true.
(6) Corroboration. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section
where proof of falsity rests solely upon contradiction by testimony of a single person
other than the defendant.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 (1980).
44. See generally Anthony Salzman, Recantation of Perjured Testimony, 67 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 273 (1976) (arguing that more states should enact a retraction defense). Delaware,
Maine, and New York adopted § 241.1(4)'s retraction defense almost verbatim: "It is an affirmative
defense that the [accused] retracted [the falsification] in the course of the... proceeding in which
it was made, . . . before. . . it became manifest that [the falsification] was or would be exposed."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1232 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 451(3) (West 1983);
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210.25 (McKinney 1988). Missouri also agreed that encouraging retraction is
sufficiently desirable to justify the risk of encouraging perjury initially and followed the approach
taken by the Model Penal Code and by Colorado, New York, Michigan, Alaska, Montana, and
Texas. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 575.040, Comment to 1973 Proposed Code, at 177 (Vernon 1979).
Similarly, North Dakota provides:
It is a defense ... that the actor retracted the falsification in the course of the official
proceeding or matter in which it was made, if in fact he did so before it became
manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed and before the falsification
substantially affected the proceeding or the matter.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-04(3) (1985). Washington provides that "[sitatements made in separate
hearings at separate stages of the same trial, administrative, or other official proceeding shall be
treated as if made in the course of the same proceeding." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.060
(West 1988).
Colorado and New Jersey provide an affirmative defense if the retraction occurs during the
proceeding, but there is no requirement that retraction occur before it is clear that the falsehood was
or would be discovered. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(d) (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1989). Oregon requires (i) the defense prove the retraction was voluntary
and (ii) that it occur before the proceeding's subject matter is submitted to the ultimate trier of fact.
OR. REV. STAT. § 162.105(1) (1990).
45. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988).
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STATUS OF THE PERJURY STATUTES

Sections 162146 and 162347 of Title 18 of the United States Codes are

designed to facilitate efficient criminal investigation unhampered by impediments
of witness self-interest.49 Section 1621 codifies common law perjury ° and
covers any statement made before a competent tribunal, officer, or person,"
whereas section 1623 covers false declarations during a court or grand jury
proceeding. 52 Before addressing the differences between the federal perjury

46. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) in pertinent part provides:
Whoever ... having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare or certify truly ... willfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true is guilty of pejury
and shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be fined not more than $2000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
Id.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988) in pertinent part provides:
Whoever under oath ... in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States knowingly makes any material declaration or makes or uses
any other information .... or other material, knowing the same to contain any false
declaration, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both ....
Id.
48. Section 1622 addresses perjury subordination and is beyond this note's scope. Succinctly,
"[t]o constitute subordination of perjury ... the party must procure the commission of the perjury
by inciting, or persuading the witness to commit the crime. Perjury must have been actually
committed ....
" United States v. Petite, 147 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D. Md. 1957); see also Tedesco
v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that lawyer suborned by not advising
witness against testifying falsely after hearing proposed false testimony). Inherent in this note's
conclusion, that §§ 1621 and 1623 should be combined into one federal perjury statute, is the
recognition that § 1622 should remain a separate, distinct statute.
49. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 68 (1951); see United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d
1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 1623's central purpose is encouraging
truthful testimony before a court and grand jury), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980). Both sections
were amended in 1976 to cover 28 U.S.C. § 1746's permitted unsworn declarations. Under § 1746,
certain statements that generally must be supported by an oath may be supported, "with like force
and effect," by the declarant's statement that such matter is true under penalty of perjury. 28
U.S.C. § 1746 (1988). See Dickinsonv. Wainwright, 626 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
that habeas corpus petition statement that "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct" satisfies oath requirement).
50. See Act of April 30, 1790, supra note 8. Section 1621 remains virtually unchanged since
the first perjury statute's 1790 passage.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988). Sufficient formality must exist before § 1623 applies. The
Supreme Court has construed the formality requirement strictly, holding that statements in contests
less formal than depositions are not made in formal, ancillary proceedings. See Dunn v. United
States, 442 U.S. 100, 111-12 (1979) (explaining that sworn statement with attorney not within §
1623's requirements). The Dunn Court relied on statements in both the House and Senate Reports
specifying pretrial depositions as the sole example of an ancillary proceeding. See HOUSE REPORT,
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statutes and the problematic areas of each, it is important to understand how
each statute operates. Additionally, certain procedural issues, 53 as well as the
enforcement of the pejury statutes,' are not addressed at length because of
their slight effect on the current problems caused by the federal perjury statutes.

supra note 10, at 48; SENATE REPoRT, supra note 16, at 145. See also United States v. Krogh, 366
F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D.D.C. 1973) (explaining that sworn deposition in Assistant Attorney
General's Office ancillary to Watergate grand jury was sufficiently formal).
The 1970 Organized Crime Control Act's legislative history intended to ameliorate some of
§ 1621's obstacles confronting perjury prosecution, and thereby enhance reliable testimony before
federalcourts. HOUSEREPORT, supra note 10, at 48. The Act's purpose was to eradicate organized
crime by strengthening the legal tools of the evidence-gathering process by establishing new penal
provisions, and providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime. Statement of President-ElectEdward L Wright before House
Judiciary Committee, 9 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 71 (1970).
53. For example, a perjury indictment will not be dismissed when the testimony's falsity
becomes manifest unless the testimony is immaterial to the case. See United States v. Claiborne,
765 F.2d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 1985) (failing to dismiss indictment where alleged perjury pertained to
counts dismissed before trial and immaterial to defendant's indictment on other counts). The same
judge may preside over the proceeding where the defendant initially committed perjury and the
perjury trial. See United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127, 128 (4th Cir.) (explaining that judge is
permitted to preside over both motion for new trial and subsequent trial for perjury allegedly
committed during motion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984). Appellate courts review jury
verdicts de novo. See United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
appellate court decides de novo whether jury could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that both
declarant and government similarly understood question and that declarant's answer was false);
United States v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1985).
Appellate courts will leave the jury's decision undisturbed if it is based on a finding that the
defendant knew the statement was false. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir.
1986) (reviewing court will not disturb jury decision if jury has been properly charged; defendant
cannot be convicted for making false statement by mistake or inadvertence).
The reviewing court will not disturb the jury's determination where the jury relied on a
particular theory the evidence validly supported, despite the jury's reliance on another theory that
is insufficient to support a conviction. See United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489, 498 (10th Cir.
1986) (upholding conviction because jury placed main emphasis on primary, valid theory).
54. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for investigating perjury
committed before federal tribunals. See UNITED STATES ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-69.230, at 6
(1978). The Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Postal Inspection Service investigate
perjury arising from a matter under investigation by those agencies. Id. The section of the Justice
Department with responsibility for the substantive matter under investigation also has supervisory
jurisdiction over perjury committed during the investigation. Id. § 9-69.240, at 7.
When the subject matter is unidentified, the Criminal Division's General Crimes Section has
supervisory jurisdiction. Id. United States Attorneys are directed to notify the General Crimes
Section in perjury cases involving exceptional circumstances, especially when a question of statutory
construction is involved. Id. Moreover, each district's United States Attorney has discretion to
direct further investigation of an alleged false statement. Id. Prior authorization for prosecution
from Department of Justice's Criminal Division is not required, except regarding congressional
matters. Id.
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A. Elements of the Offense
A section 1621 perjury conviction requires that four substantive elements
be proven.55 First, the declarant must take an oath to testify truthfully.
Second, the declarant's willful false statement must be contrary to the oath.
Third, the declarant must believe that the statement is false. Fourth, there must
be a relationship between the statement and a material fact. m Section 162317
maintains the same materiality and oath requirements as section 1621; however,
section 1623 defines intent as knowledge, rather than willfulness.s
This
difference means that a section 1621 declarant must willfully offer testimony that
the declarant believes is false, but a section 1623 witness must knowingly present

55. Recommended federal criminal jury instructions for 18 U.S.C. § 1621 charges are:
The elements of perjury are:
1. On or about [insert date] the defendant took an oath to testify truthfully before
the [insert tribunal]; and
2. The defendant deliberately gave testimony that was false with the intent to
deceive the [insert tribunal].
If you decide that the government proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant guilty. Otherwise, you must find the defendant not
guilty.
JOSEPHINE R. PoTuTo Er AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PART Six, f1-463 (1991).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). See United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 574 (1958)
(explaining that statement made pursuant to oath authorized by district court satisfies § 1621
requirement that United States law authorize oath); United States v. Cross, 638 F.2d 1375, 1378 (5th
Cir. 1981) (reversing conviction because of insufficient evidence to determine which statement was
false when only one of two inconsistent statements made under oath); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks
v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 881 n.1 (D.D.C.) (noting that willful perjury punished under § 1621
when oath is required), affid, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
57. The following are 18 U.S.C. § 1623 model jury instructions:
The elements of making a false statement before a (court) (grand jury) are:
1. On or about [insert date] the defendant took an oath to testify truthfully before
the [insert tribunal]; and
2. While under oath the defendant (made the following statement) (used the
following record or document) [insert the statement or describe the record or
document); and
3. The (statement) (record or document) was false; and
4. The defendant knew when (he) (she) (made the statement) (gave the document
or record) to the [insert tribunal] that is was false and (he) (she) (made the statement)
(gave the document or record) without disclosing that it was false.
If you decide that the government proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant guilty. Otherwise, you must find the defendant not
guilty.
PoTUTo, supra note 55, at H-471.
58. See United States v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
specific intent to impede justice's administration through false statement not required by § 1623);
United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that knowledge of false
declaration satisfies § 1623); United States v. Roche, No. 91-595-13, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1992) (deciding that § 1623 does not require specific intent to commit the
offense, knowledge by the declarant that the statement was false is sufficient).
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9

false testimony.5

1. The Oath Requirement
Whether the defendant took an oath is rarely an issue because it is easily
proven.' Section 1621 oaths must occur before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person."
Grand juries' and congressional committees,' for example,
constitute competent tribunals." Section 1621 violations can also occur outside

59. Gillen et al., supra note 2, at 623. Both §§ 1621's and 1623's elements of prosecution do
not have to be separate; rather, they may be interrelated. See Sands v. Cunningham, 617 F. Supp.
1551, 1555-56 (D.N.H. 1985) (noting that evidence pertaining to materiality may intertwine with
evidence relevant to falsity).
60. The indictment need only aver that the defendant was duly sworn; it is unnecessary to
include the oath's details. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953). The oath element is
present if a specific rle requires the oath when a statute generally authorizes rule making. United
States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958). Nonetheless, proof that the statements were made under oath
is an essential element for conviction under either § 1621 or § 1623.
Evidence that a defendant was duly sworn in at a court proceeding sufficiently proves either
section's oath requirement. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253,254 (9th Cir. 1978) (deciding
that a defendant duly sworn in at a court proceeding proves the oath element). Not every knowingly
false statement under oath, however, is perjurious. See United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220,
1226 (2d Cir. 1971) (treating every false statement under oath as perjury, per se, would eliminate
materiality requirement).
No particular formalities are required for a valid oath, as long as it was in the presence of one
authorized to administer it, and the oath-maker realized its gravity and significance. See United
States v. Yoshida, 727 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1983) (deeming oath given by notary public proper).
Official trial transcripts prove the testimony was given under oath, and they are admissible as
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(5) or 803(8) hearsay exceptions. See United States v. Arias, 575
F.2d at 254-55 (noting that official trial transcript sufficiently shows oath was taken).
The right to question an oath's sufficiency is waived unless timely objection is made. Id. at
254 (deciding transcript's recital that declarant has been duly sworn sufficiently establishes oath's
validity absent timely objection at trial); Vuckson v. United States, 354 F.2d 918, 921-22 (9th Cir.
1966) (noting that there is a strong presumption that testimony before a grand jury was given under
oath, absent a failure to move for acquittal on the grounds that there was insufficient proof of
testimony under oath).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
62. See United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.) (explaining that the grand jury is
a competent tribunal for perjury prosecution's purposes), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
63. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 91 n.161 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity and the House Judiciary Committee
are competent tribunals for perjury prosecution's purposes), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
64. A grand jury must have subject matter and personal jurisdiction to qualify as a competent
tribunal. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66 (1950). See also United States v. Swainson,
548 F.2d 657, 664 (6th Cir. 1977) (describing circumstances when grand jury constitutes competent
tribunal); United States v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662, 666 (E.D. Va. 1982) (following Williams),
afrd, 722 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1983); cf. United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (explaining that where tribunal's competency is in question, prosecution bears burden of
proving competency).
The declarant is unprotected from perjury prosecution if the grand jury is flawed, because
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formal judicial or congressional settings,' so long as the prosecution
establishes the oath giver's identity, competency, and authority.'
Unlike section 1621, section 1623 oaths may only be administered during
a proceeding before or ancillary to a United States court or grand jury.'
Under section 1623, proof that the statement occurred before an appropriate
authority, and that the individual taking the oath was cognizant of its
implications, sufficiently fulfills section 1623's requirements.' Because section
1623 prosecutions are confined to statements during court and grand jury
proceedings, courts may infer that the defendant testified under oath.'
2. The Requisite Intent
A perjury prosecution's second element is the declarant's willful or
knowing subscription to a false statement under oath.'
A person who gives

flaws in formation do not render the grand jury incompetent. See United States v. Caron, 551 F.
Supp. at 666-67 (holding question as to grand jury's seating irrelevant; prosecution proper where
defendant made false statements to grand jury).
65. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66. See United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). A competent tribunal
has subject matter jurisdiction and authority to render judgment on the particular indictment. United
States v. Wiliams, 341 U.S. 58, 66 (1951).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988). Unlike § 1621, § 1623 does not require the government to prove
who administered the oath, or whether that person was competent or authorized to administer it.
See United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that § 1623 merely
requires government to prove knowingly false statement made before court was under oath at time
of statement).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
69. See United States v. Molinares, 700 F. 2d 647, 651 n.6 (l1th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
Congress may have reasoned that § 1621's additional requirements were inappropriate to § 1623
proceedings; § 1623 proceedings taking place before a court or grand jury implies the defendant
testified under oath); Vuckson v. United States, 354 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 991 (1966).
Additionally, questions regarding an oath's sufficiency are waived unless promptly objected
to. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a perjury
prosecution at previous trial was barred); Vuckson v. United States, 354 F.2d at 921-22 (noting
where no motion for acquittal on ground of oath's insufficiency, validity strongly presumed).
Also, under § 1623, a defectively empaneled grand jury neither renders the oath void nor the
court or grand jury incompetent. See United States v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662, 665 (noting that
a perjury charge is valid when committed before jury that violated the 1968 Jury Selection and
Service Act), affid, 772 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1983).
70. Section 1623 requires only knowledge while § 1621 dictates a specific wifi intent. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1988); see United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 1990)
(explaining that willfulness, in addition to knowledge, not a necessary § 1623 element); United States
v. Goguen, 723 F. 2d 1012, 1020 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that simple knowledge required under §
1623, but § 1621 requires willful deception); United States v. Watson, 623 F. 2d 1198, 1207 (7th
Cir. 1980) (deciding § 1621 violations require willfulness, but § 1623 violations require only
knowledge); see also United States v. Martellano, 675 F. 2d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining
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a literally accurate, technically responsive, or legally truthful answer cannot be
convicted of perjury, despite knowingly deceiving the questioner. 71 The
questioner must ask facially unambiguous questions.' Where ambiguity exists
on the questioner's part, the fact finder decides whether the declarant answered

that knowingly false answers concerning material facts violate § 1623); United States v. Crippen,
570 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting defendant's knowledge of statement's falsity is essence
of false swearing crime), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v. Brontson, 453 F.2d
555, 560 (2d Cir. 1971) (deciding defendant's knowledge of statement's falsity at time given
essential), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
Congress made § 1623's mens rea "knowingly" instead of "willfully" to ease the prosecution's
burden. IA LEANARD B. SAND Er AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1148.02, at 48-30
to -31 (1992).
71. E.g., United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that perjury
indictment failed because it did not specify manner defendant falsely replied); see also United States
v. Makris, 483 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing perjury conviction because defendant
gave apparently correct response; prosecution failed to prove otherwise), cer. denied, 415 U.S. 914
(1974). The declarant's attempt to correct a statement may indicate that the defendant did not intend
any misrepresentation. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 576 (1937) (noting
willingness to correct misstatement may show perjurious intent's absence); United States v. Kahn,
472 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir. 1973) (deciding where evidence sufficient for perjury, retraction may
show intent's absence), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d
1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956) (noting willingness to correct misstatement not defense, but many negate intent);
United States v. Denison, 508 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (M.D. La. 1981) (deciding prosecution barred
only if perjury has not substantially affected proceeding and not become manifest).
Later testimony must show that the original testimony constituted an incomplete or mistaken
answer. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. at 576 (noting that innocent mistake's correction or
earlier answer's elaboration may show perjurious intent's absence); Beckanstin v. United States, 232
F.2d at 4 (explaining that willingness to correct mistake helps negate existence of willful intent to
swear falsely); United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (deciding that
declarant must make retraction promptly with no likelihood declarant recanted because officials
discovered perjury).
A perjury conviction may be barred where the declarant's answer is susceptible to multiple
interpretations. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that
conviction will not stand where intent to falsify cannot be determined from ambiguous questions);
United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that testimony insufficient to
sustain conviction because defendant's negative response, despite its factual falsity, was legally
correct answer); United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967) (deciding that evidence
insufficient to support conviction where defendant's answer regarding whether she had "been on trips
with Max" was susceptible to two interpretations).
72. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F. 2d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that perjury
conviction may not stand on particular interpretation questioner places on answer); United States v.
Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that declarant's testimony cannot be perjurious
when declarant made to guess at question's meaning); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654
(1lth Cir. 1984) (questioning cannot be vague or ill-defined); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d
194, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1978) (deciding prosecutor's question whether accused "handled" checks too
ambiguous; accused could justifiably infer "handled" meant "touched").
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falsely.'
The test is whether the question, as the declarant objectively
understood it, is falsely answered. 74

73. See United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining jury must
decide whether defendant committed perjury where there are multiple interpretations of ambiguous
questions); United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting jury decides
defendant's understanding of question).
If declarant's statement is ambiguous, the prosecutor must prove the declarant understood that
the question had the particular meaning that rendered the answer false. See, e.g., United States v.
Maultaseh, 596 F.2d 19, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining that question not specifically mentioning
certain accounts unambiguouswhere accounts unlikely to have "skipped appellant's mind"); United
States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1967) (noting that fact finder's first duty is
determining which interpretation accused used, before determining veracity); Beckanstin v. United
States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956) (determining that accused's false statement regarding
graduating from M.I.T. excusable because accused had not grasped form of question).
A defendant who successfully proves she misunderstood the question may not be convicted
under § 1621 or § 1623. See, e.g., Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d at 2-4 (explaining that
declarant acquitted notwithstanding false statement, because court changed line of questioning before
declarant could correct error, and because declarant's attorney claimed error was trivial); United
States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1954) (noting absence of intent to deceive negates
corrupt motive); United States v. Clifford, 426 F. Supp. 696, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (deciding that
there can be no perjury prosecution if question's intent is ambiguous when asked); United States v.
Ceccerelli, 350 F. Supp. 475, 478 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (holding questions about whether accused "met
with" certain individuals on "regular" basis unambiguous in context asked); United States v. Sweig,
316 F. Supp. 1148, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (explaining that unresponsive answer reflecting
misunderstanding rather than perjury may not defeat indictment, but may affect whether case should
go to jury).
Likewise, the fact finder must determine, by an objective test, whether the declarant's
ambiguous answer is false. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that jury best determines defendant's meaning); United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838,
848 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that jury best decides whether defendant's ambiguous answer regarding
identification of stamps was false); United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that jury decides defendant's understanding of question).
74. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). A declarant seeking to
avoid perjury conviction will naturally allege "understanding" a question in a manner that the
answer, based on this "understanding," was truthful. In either situation, the fact finder should
discern the meaning given the question and the answer's veracity within the context of the entire line
of questioning. Id. at 373 (explaining that jury may look at entire line of questioning concerning
knowledge of trust account to determine if declarant answered falsely.) Extrinsic evidence may also
be considered. Id.
The Supreme Court held that § 1621 'does not make it a [crime] for a witness to wilfully state
a material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true." Brontson v.
United States, 409 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1973). In explaining its holding the court reasoned:
A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture of whether any unresponsive
answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner;
the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether
he does not believe his answer to be true.
Id. at 358-60.
Carelessness, honest mistake, inadvertence, misunderstanding, or neglect in falsely answering
preclude a perjury conviction, because the witness lacks knowing deceit in these circumstances. See,
e.g., United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that mere
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3. The Falsity Element
Falsity is perjury's most basic element. Whether the declarant made the
false statement in reply to a question or offered it voluntarily is irrelevant."
The perjury indictment need not ascertain the actual truth. Instead, the
prosecution need only assert that certain statements were false.76 In Brontson
v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held that a perjury
conviction could not be based on unresponsive testimony deemed untrue by

mistake is insufficient ground on which to base perjury conviction); United States v. Martellano, 675
F.2d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that false answer given because of honest mistake,
carelessness, neglect, or misunderstanding does not constitute false swearing); United States v.
Kehoe, 562 F.2d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1977) (deciding that false answer given because of inadvertence,
honest mistake, carelessness, neglect, or misunderstanding is not perjury); United States v. Sweig,
316 F.Supp. 1148, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that nonresponsive answer may reflect
misunderstanding rather than perjury).
Perjury conviction in such situations is contrary to the common law view, adopted by the
Supreme Court, that perjury's punishment should not be so harsh as to discourage potential witnesses
from coming forward and testifying. Brontson v. United States, 409 U.S. at 359-60. Additionally,
courts have held that a non-responsive answer reflects a misunderstanding rather than a deliberate
falsification. See United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining when
unresponsive answer is facially true, fact finder should not consider whether it is intended to mislead
questioner, but should determine whether declarant does not believe answer's truth); United States
v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. at 1164 (noting that defendant's misunderstanding of questioner's assertion
as question generated unresponsive answer).
75. See, e.g., United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 565 n.II (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that declarant, who proffered false testimony relating to loan, is not necessarily immune from
prosecution).
76. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
indictment must simply state that part of the declarant's testimony was false). At statement of the
precise untruths, however, must be alleged with sufficient clarity. See United States v. Cowley, 720
F.2d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1983) (overturning conviction because indictment failed to distinguish
objective truth from supposedly false statements), cer. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984); United States
v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977) (same). Additionally, § 1623(c) provides that where
two or more inconsistent statements exist, to the degree that one is false, the government need not
determine which statement is false. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 644 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir.
1981) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c)).
The allegedly perjurious statement, however, must constitute a factual assertion. See Kolaski
v. United States, 362 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1966) (dismissing information when factual assertion
not possibly true). Each false statement a defendant makes constitutes a separate perjury incident.
That separate lies before a tribunal are punishable is a well established rule. See United States v.
McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 565 (7th Cir. 1984) (convicting former state congressman who lied twice
regarding campaign contributions under investigation of each perjury count); United States v. De
La Torre, 634 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing defendant charged with five separate perjury
counts based on separate statements given at one trial); United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 471
(2d Cir.) (deciding that separate lies before grand jury are punishable when each critical inquiry is
directed to separate facet of overall transaction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); United States
v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. 1973) (explaining that indictment properly charged six
perjury counts where each was based on response to question regarding separate fact).
77. 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
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negative implication.S
Although Brontson concerned a section 1621
conviction, the Court's rationale has been extended to section 1623.'
Most courts have adopted Brontson's rationale.s'

The Fifth Circuit,

78. Brontson v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). The Court stated that if the declarant
speaks the literal truth, her answer-even if calculated to evade or mislead-is not grounds for a
perjury prosecution. Id. at 360, 362.
In narrowly interpreting § 1621, the Brontson Court placed the burden on the questioner to
eliminate the possibility of evasion and require responsive answers by "pin[ning] the witness down
to the specific object of . . . inquiry." See Brontson v. United States, 409 U.S. at 360-62
(explaining that precise questioning imperative as predicate for perjury offense); United States v.
Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561,
1580-81 (11th Cir.) (following Brontson), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v.
Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3rd Cir. 1978) (noting that a charge of perjury is not a substitute for
a prosecutor's careful questioning); United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that perjury conviction failed for lack of specificity, critical question, and unequivocal
answer).
The Sixth Circuit applied Brontson's rule to protect from perjury a defendant's testimony that
was literally true, but unresponsive to the examiner's question. United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d
564, 571 (6th Cir. 1984). Eddy's defendant was questioned regarding whether he submitted an
official transcript or medical diploma in order to defraud the Navy as to his actual credentials. Id.
at 568-69. Eddy said "no" to both charges. Id. His answers were found literally true because the
documents were falsities and not "official" items. Id. The court held that the defendant's
misleading answers were literally true in light of the meaning Eddy, not his interrogators, attributed
to questions. Id. at 571.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d at 567; United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d
1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 847 (lst Cir. 1983).
80. See United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Brontson and
dismissing indictment where government charge based on false implications of statement not false
in itself); United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining that impressive
questioning cannot be predicate for perjury conviction); see also United States v. Niemiec, 611 F.2d
1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining that Brontson standard was not violated where question was
direct and precise and answers were responsive); United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 104 (8th
Cir. 1978) (noting jury cannot convict for unresponsive but literally true declaration); United States
v. Laikin, 583 F.2d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 1978) (deciding that different answers to slightly different
questions were consistent with Brontson's literal truth standard); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d
194, 196-98 (3rd Cir. 1978) (requiring acquittal where failure to specifically allege falsehoods
charged and to ask specific, unambiguous questions); United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411,42123 (5th Cir.) (requiring acquittal where questioner failed to pin down witness and prove answers'
falsity), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that Bronson was not intended to apply to false responses, even if unresponsive);
United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1976) (ruling that one cannot base perjury
conviction on implied false information from literally true responses).
In each case, courts carefully scrutinize the defendant's testimony to determine the specificity
of the prosecutor's questions and the literal truthfulness of the defendant's answers. See Brontson
v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1973). In Bronuson, the defendant did not commit perjury
where his answers, although unresponsive and misleading, were not untrue. The testimony was as
follows:
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Brontson?
A. No, sir.
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however, in United States v. Adi,5 ' lessened the questioner's burden in
situations where the subject of the inquiry is apparent to the declarant.' The
Central District of California further extended Brontson's reasoning in United
States v. Spalliero," to encompass responsive, but equivocal, answers to
unambiguous questions.s"

Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss banks?
A. No, air.
Q. Have you ever?
A. No, air.
Id. at 354.
The Court stated that it was undisputed that the defendant's answers were literally truthful for
three reasons. First, the defendant did not, when questioned, have a Swiss bank account. Second,
his company had the Swiss account described (although defendant also had a personal account in the
past). Third, neither at the time of nor before the questioning did the defendant have nominees with
Swiss accounts. Id. at 354-55. See also United States v. Eddy, 77 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1984)
(explaining when defendant's responses were literally true in light of meaning he attributed to
questions, perjury conviction could not stand).
The perjury charge's dismissal is not required in circumstances where the answer is
demonstrably false or the questions are precise and unequivocal. See United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (affirming perjury conviction where untrue answers supplied);
United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that unresponsive but false
testimony violates § 1621). See also United States v. Niemiec, 611 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980)
(affirming perjury conviction where questioning direct and precise); United States v. Anfield, 539
F.2d 674, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1976) (failing to dismiss perjury charge proper because questions were
precise, simple, direct, and unequivocal).
81. 759 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1985).
82. In Adi, a federal grand jury questioned Adi regarding false statements made in a Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms "Firearms Transaction Record." United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d
404, 410 (5th Cir. 1985). Adi, the purchaser of the weapon in question, paid a friend to acquire
firearms and to complete the required report as if the friend were the actual purchaser. Id. at 406.
In arguing the questions were ambiguous, Adi contended that the questions were "devoid of any
facts concerning the precise time, date and place to which the inquiry was directed." The line of
questioning was as follows:
Q. But were you with this June fellow when he was buying guns?
A. (Nods [sic] head) No.
Q. So you didn't participate in any of the conversation any way?
A. What I am saying is I don't even know he was buying anything...
Id. at 410.
The court rejected this argument because the time frame referred to in the incident was clear.
Id. Another Fifth Circuit case supported the court's proposition. That court stated that "[ijf
[an]
answer to an . .. ambiguous question [satisfies] the jury . . .that the defendant knowingly made
a false statement, then the statement may serve as the predicate for the offense." United States v.
Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. 602 F. Supp. 417 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
84. United States v. Spalliero, 602 F. Supp. 417, 420-22 (C.D.Cal. 1984). Unlike Brontson
and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, Spailiero presented the problem of questions that contain a
double negative. Id. at 420-24; see, e.g., United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Matthews, 589 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United
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The jury decides whether an answer is false depending upon surrounding
circumstances" or possible interpretations of ambiguous questions.' The test
is what the question objectively meant to the declarant at the time of questioning,
and not the declarant's subjective belief as to its meaning." The use of false
documents in testimony is also grounds for a section 1623 conviction.'

States v. Cash, 522 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1975),
The examiner's questions included: "You have never paid him any money?" Id. at 423. After
one non-responsive reply, the examiner asked, "Is the answer no, sir?" The declarant said "No."
Id. The court noted that a "yes" or "no" answer is ambiguous to such a question. Id. at 424.
Although the implied response was false, a precise grammatical reading of the declarant's reply
revealed a literally true answer. Id. at 422. However, relying on Brontson, the court stated that
it was the questioner's responsibility to ask clear questions and to clarify ambiguous answers. Id.
See also United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1973) ("A precise grammatical reading
of the challenged question and answer demonstrates that [declarant's] answer was literally true.").
85. See United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1986) (surrounding
circumstances indicated that had defendant read notes he would have known they did not accurately
reflect another party's involvement in business meetings).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that jury
decides if answer to ambiguous question is perjury); United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 85-86
(3d Cir. 1977) (noting that where answer would be true on one construction of ambiguous question
but not true on another, jury must decide answer's veracity).
87. See United States v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that facially
clear words are understood in their common sense and usage and deciding jury could conclude that
defendant's reference to "New Orleans" not only included city itself but also suburb); United States
v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 567-69 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that to support conviction for falsely denying
submittal of official documents to navy medical programs recruiter, it must be determined defendant
was fully aware of actual meaning behind examiner's questions); United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d
398,400 (6th Cir. 1967) (deciding that it is necessary to determine what question meant to defendant
when he answered).
Perjury convictions must be based on the declarant's false statement, not on a particular
interpretation given to the statement by a questioner. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367,
374 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that truth or falsity of declarant's statement concerning certain bank
accounts depends on objective meaning of examiner's questions, not examiner's interpretations of
declarant's answers).
88. Section 1623(a) provides that "whoever ...makes or uses any... information, including
any book, paper, document, record, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false
material declaration, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both." 18 U.S.C. §1623(a) (1988).
Courts focus on the statutory meaning of "uses" and have rejected a narrow reading that would
require charged parties to deliver the documents to the grand jury and to rely on them for their
testimony. See United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that
physical delivery unnecessary when defendant knew document contained false material declarations;
testimony as to falsity constituted use); United States v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92, 98 (10th Cir.)
(falsifying subpoenaed documents and relying on them to testify constitutes use of records), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974). Rather, courts have found that false testimony based on altered
documents constitutes the documents' "use" within the statute's meaning. See United States v.
Pommerening, 500 F.2d at 98 (explaining that documents' delivery unnecessary for use; defendant
only need base testimony on documents).
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4. The Materiality Requirement
Both sections 1621 and 1623 require that false statements be material for
a conviction." The test for materiality is broad.' If the statement was prone
to hinder or obstruct the investigation's progress, 9 or if the testimony could
have influenced the tribunal with respect to matters the body is competent to

89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 44 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Finucan,
708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Ostertag, 671 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d
1371, 1372 (5th Cir. 1977).
A materiality determination is a legal question the court decides. United States v. Flowers,

813 F.2d 1320, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987); see, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99
(1929); United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489, 494 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bednar,
728 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); United States v. Carter, 721
F.2d 1514, 1535 (11th Cir.), cert. denied subnom, Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984);
United States v. Cunningham, 723 F.2d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984);
United States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1983) cerr. denied, 465 U.S. 1036

(1984); United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Howard, 560
F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1977); Larocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1964).
Section 1623 similarly applies § 1621's materiality tests. See United States v. Mancuso, 485
F.2d 275, 280 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that there is no indication in § 1623 that Congress
intended any change in the nature of the materiality requirement). See also United States v. Sun
Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1237 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that because materiality is a legal
question, appellate court may substitute judgment for that of lower court on materiality issue), cert.

denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
90. See United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (defining materiality
broadly); United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983).
91. See United States v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339, 1349-50 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding
materiality respecting denial of knowledge of legitimate stock accounts because such denial delayed
investigation of fraud), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d
453,465 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding materiality respecting false testimony concerning location of pilot's
log book in drug smuggling investigation), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986); United States v.
McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that statement that has effect or tendency
to impede, influence, or dissuade tribunal or grand jury from pursuing its investigation material);
United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.) (hindering investigation of embezzlement
scheme found material), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); United States v. Varsalona, 710 F.2d
418, 421 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that false statement not made immaterial by fact that no crime was
actually committed); United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding
testimony was material because it had natural effect or tendency to influence, impede, or dissuade
grand jury from indicting); United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193, 1198 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding
materiality where defendant's testimony had "natural effect" of dissuading grand jury); United States
v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding testimony to grand jury concerning complex
"money-changing" was material because it was capable of impeding proceedings); United States v.
Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1977) (deciding defendant's statement, in light of his
position in music industry, sufficient to establish that false testimony would impede grand jury).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1533 (1st Cir. 1989); United States
v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 44 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267,268 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Damato, 554 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Neal, 822 F.2d 1502,
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consider," then the testimony is material.'
A false statement may be
material although it relates to collateral issues" or other proper matters of

1506 (10th Cir. 1987) (deeming material defendant's false statement that misled and impeded grand
jury investigation); United States v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
defendant judge's false statements concerning disposition of DUI cases material because hindered
administration of justice); United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that
test of materiality satisfied if statements may be material to matters that might influence outcome of
decision); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1980) (deciding that testimony
material when it influences investigating body's decision); United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741,
745 (2d Cir.) (holding that testimony influenced trial judge because showed defendant's knowledge
of client's guilt), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1978); United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768, 770
(6th Cir. 1976) ('[E]ssentially anything that could influence or mislead the trial court or the jury is
considered material ...
."); United States v. Lazaros, 480 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir. 1973) (ruling
that materiality's test is ability to influence tribunal), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974); United
States v. Paris, 448 F.2d 1277, 1278 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding testimony material if jury would have
acquitted had it believed defendant's false statements).
The difference between "the prone to hinder or obstruct" standard and the "tendency to
influence" standard is really semantics. Different circuits have worded the test differently, but have
used the same analysis. See United States v. Lazaros, 480 F.2d at 177 (using "influencing the
tribunal" and "tendency to impede" language interchangeably).
The Second Circuit disagrees, however, regarding the stringency of the test to be used.
CompareUnited States v. Mancuso, 485 F.2d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding materiality if it could
conceivably aid investigation) with United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1227 (2d Cir. 1971)
(finding material if it would aid investigation). Because of this difference, many Second Circuit
courts limit Freedman to its facts. E.g., United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 n.1 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 470 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976).
93. E.g., United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 332 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McFarland, 371 F.2d 701 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967) LaRocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39, 43 (8th Cir.
1964).
94. Further, the mere potential to impede, or to influence, has been found to establish
materiality, as have questions upon a witness' cross-examination. See United States v. McComb,
744 F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that defendant's false testimony to grand jury about
contributions to political action committee potentially impedes investigation); United States v.
Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 653 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (noting that materiality test is satisfied if statements
may be material to matters that might influence outcome of decision); United States v. Howard, 560
F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1977) (deciding that grand jury investigation of bombing was potentially
impeded by defendant's false statements as to his whereabouts); see also United States v. Abrams,
568 F.2d 411, 421 (5th Cir.) (explaining that false statement did not impede but influenced fraud
investigation), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978). See also United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838,
848 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that even though not dispositive of an issue before a tribunal, a statement
could be material if it had potential to mislead the tribunal); cf Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d
516, 519 (5th Cir. 1955) (explaining that defendant's false testimony suppressed important evidence
concerning content of liquor still operator's statements to sheriff).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 268 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining
that collateral statements sufficiently material if influential on grand jury's decision); United States
v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 420 (5th Cir.) (finding material "any proper matter of inquiry"), cen.
denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding material collateral matters "that might influence the court . . . in the decision of the
questions before the tribunal"); United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1976)
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inquiry," including credibility.' The government has the burden of proving
that the defendant's statements are material to issues before the grand jury.s
Having analyzed how each statute operates, the most important difference
between the statutes-the availability of defenses such as retraction-should be
examined.

(noting that requirement is only that false declarations have a "tendency to influence, impede or
hamper a tribunal").
96. See United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d at 420 (explaining that false testimony was material
to proper matter of inquiry in insurance claim fraud investigation); United States v. Freedman, 445
F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that it must be shown that truthful answer would have
been probative to inquiry, causing further investigation).
97. See United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining that difference
between number of chairs defendant admitted to having and number alleged by government was
material to defendant's credibility); Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 1955)
(finding defendant's statements discredited chief prosecution material); United States v. Weiler, 143
F.2d 204, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1944) (explaining that defendant's statements regarding actions that relate
to explanation material to credibility), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 606 (1945). But see United
States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining that statements must have
probative value connected with inquiry's scope).
Materiality's determination depends upon the circumstances in which the testimony was given.
See United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.) (explaining that testimony regarding
false entries in firm books was material to allegation of embezzlement of securities brokerage firm)
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); United States v. Armilio, 705 F.2d 939, 941 (8th Cir.) (noting
that testimony regarding purchase of handgun was material to possession of firearms charge), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v. Howard, 560 F.2d 281,284 (7th Cir. 1977) (deciding
that materiality should be determined at time of investigation); United States v. Germillion, 464 F.2d
901, 905 (5th Cir.) ("materiality need only be established as of the time the answers were given"),
cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.3 (9th Cir.
1971) (holding that false testimony material even if later proven that truthful statement would not
have helped grand jury), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972); United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138,
140-41 (2d Cir. 1970) (ruling that materiality refers merely to relationship between interrogation and
grand jury's objective; thus it must be established as of time witness' answers given).
98. E.g., United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827
(1984); United States v. Ostertag, 671 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1982). For example, the Fourth
Circuit stated "the government must establish a nexus between the [grand jury's] investigation and
[a defendant's] false declaration." United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1986).
The government need not prove that the testimony impeded the grand jury. Nevertheless, "there
must... be a minimal showing that the testimony at issue had the capacity to affect the outcome
of the grand jury's investigative proceedings." See United States v. Friedhaber, 826 F.2d 284, 286
(4th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 856 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Swift, 809
F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1987) ("False statements to a grand jury satisfy the materiality requirement
[of § 1623] if a truthful statement might have assisted or influenced the grand jury in its
investigation. That [the] false statement did not succeed in leading the grand jury astray is
irrelevant."). See also United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1533 (1st Cir. 1989) ("the effect
necessary to meet the materiality test is relatively slight") (citing United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d
1029, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Bodnar v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 672, 673 (E.D. Mo. 1986)
("alleged perjurious statements must be considered within the context of the grand jury's
investigation"), aft'd, 855 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1988).
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B. Defenses to Perjury
1. Retraction
Retraction is not a bar to section 1621 prosecution," although the
retraction may mitigate the intent element."lo Section 1623(d) changed the
common law rule that retraction is not a defense to pejury.101 Unlike section
1621, retraction may bar section 1623 prosecution. 2 Although Congress
enacted section 1623 to cover perjury occurring before a court or grand jury,
a successful section 1623 retraction does not preclude section 1621
prosecution. 1
Consequently, a declarant who adheres to section 1623's
limited retraction defense may nevertheless be prosecuted under the general
perjury statute, section 1621. The problem is that a declarant who commits
section 1623 perjury has no incentive to correct the perjury so long as the
declarant may still be incarcerated for section 1621 perjury. Such prosecution
goes against the basic goal of perjury law, which is to encourage truthful

99. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 provides no retraction remedy. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S.
564 (1937) (explaining that retraction does not bar § 1621 prosecution); United States v. Swainson,
548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding defendant guilty of making false statements under oath before
grand jury); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir. 1975) (deciding that prompt
retraction does not excuse § 1621 peijury violation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
100. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that retraction is
relevant to show absence of intent to commit peijury). The defendant may, however, establish a
defense by using the retracted testimony to prove an absence of intent in the prior statement, or that
the prior statement was made mistakenly. See United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1971) (finding willingness to correct statement relevant to intent issue), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945
(1972); see also Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1956) (explainingthat defendant's
answer that he graduated from M.I.T., when he merely attended the school, established no deceptive
intent because he attempted to correct the testimony, but his attorney stated that the mistake was
unimportant).
Conversely, if the previous statement was obviously false or would be proven false, a
subsequent retraction will not prevent a § 1621 conviction. See United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d
657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977) (explaining that retraction came after it became manifest false statements
would be exposed).
101. United States v. Roche, No. 91-595-13, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *9 (E.D. Penn.
June 5, 1992).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988).
103. The federal government has argued that because § 1623 is "'an additional felony
provision'.. . intended to 'supplement, not supplant existing perjury provisions,'" a defendant with
a § 1623(d) defense could be prosecuted for § 1621 perjury. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272,
283 & n.8 (2d Cir.) (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 16 at 150), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982
(1973). Legislative history, however, states that § 1623(d) "serves as an inducement... to give
truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the
risk [oil prosecution [sic] by doing so." HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48 (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit noted that "we find . . .disturbing . . .the government employing §1621
whenever a recantation exists, and §1623 when one does not, simply to place perjury defendants in
the most disadvantageoustrial position." United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d at 283.
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testimony.
Section 1623 imposes four conditions on this limited defense."°4 First,
the retraction must be in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in
which the false declaration was made. 0 5 Second, the statement, when
retracted, must not have substantially affected the proceeding." °e Third, at the
time of the declaration, it must not have become manifest that the falsity would
be exposed. 0 7 Finally, the declarant must admit the declaration's falsity.'08
Although the retraction defense is examined later," section 1623's retraction
defense has been virtually unavailable because a declarant who commits section
1623 perjury may be prosecuted under the general perjury statute, section 1621.
Thus, until Congress changes the federal perjury statutes, section 1623's limited
retraction defense will remain meaningless.
Although arguments regarding the constitutionality of retractions have been
made, they have been largely unsuccessful."' Retraction does not violate the
Fifth Amendment merely because a declarant availing herself of the defense
would necessarily incriminate herself."' Additionally, because no right to
retract exists, a witness is not deprived of due process when the government

104. For an effective retraction the accused must come forward and explain unambiguously and
specifically which prior answers were false and in what respect they were false. See United States
v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that § 1623 requires outright
repudiation of prior false testimony). Neither § 1623 nor due process principles require the
prosecution to inform the declarant of the right to retract. See United States v. Scrimgeour, 636
F.2d at 1026-27 (explaining that due process does not require government to advise a grand jury
witness of right to retract).
Further, the witness has no absolute right to notification from the prosecution that the
testimony has become manifest. Id. The prosecutor may have a responsibility to advise a witness
that the testimony has raised doubts regarding veracity. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d
1273 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that possible duty to warn is not inconsistent with statute because,
if serious doubts exist as to veracity of testimony, prosecutor may have duty to inform witness).
Subsequent testimony merely casting doubt on the pejurious statement's truth does not
constitute a retraction barring prosecution. United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 679 (9th Cir.
1976) (explaining that witness did not retract but only cast doubt on what was perjurious). The
requirement that the retraction occur in the same continuous proceeding has been applied to bar
retractions made in an affidavit subsequent to the grand jury proceedings in which the initial false
statement was made. See United States v. Krough, 366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1973) (deciding that
grand jury had already acted at time of retraction).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, 175 (D.D.C. 1974) (explaining that
testimony's retraction in "Watergate affair" not unconstitutional even if admission of truth, that is
retraction's prerequisite, would admit liability for perjury prosecution).
1"
I11. Id.
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shows immediately following testimony that perjury has been committed, thus
denying an opportunity to retract." 2 Although retraction is the only statutorily
recognized defense, other defenses currently available to a declarant charged
under either section 1621 or section 1623 should be analyzed.
2. Other Defenses
The body in front of which the perjury occurred-typically a grand juryFlaws in the
must have jurisdiction over the matters investigated." 3
indictment can generate numerous defenses, such as failure to set for*h the
precise falsehood alleged and the falsehood's factual basis with sufficient clarity
to allow a jury to determine its truth. "" Several other defenses are available,

112. See United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that no
retraction right exists that would prohibit prosecutor from immediately telling declarant of evidence
of perjury). Whether a retraction is timely and effective is a legal matter decided by a court. See
United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that whether oral retraction
to Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms special agent, which occurred two months
after defendant's grand jury testimony, was timely and effective was legal matter); United States v.
D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1091 (2d Cir. 1982) (deciding whether valid offer to retract testimony has
been made to grand jury investigating illegal payoffs by insurance agency to political figures was
legal issue to be decided by court). The issue must be raised before trial or the opportunity to do
so is lost. See United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that
retraction must be raised before trial to jurisdictionally bar prosecution and if rejected retraction
issue may not be argued to jury).
113. See Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1957) (explaining that because
grand jury lacked authority to inquire into offenses committed outside its jurisdiction, false answers
given by declarant not considered perjury). Venue is only proper in the district where the statement
is uttered. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Because of the wide
latitude given grand juries to investigate, generally a defense alleging the defendant would not have
been summoned to testify absent a purpose of procuring the declarant's indictment will be
ineffective. See United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
grand jury investigation was not used as means to elicit perjury from defendant by calling him to
testify about particular conversation, despite fact that grand jury possessed conversation's recording);
see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 583 (1976) (explaining that grand jury did not
commit entrapment or abuse of process by calling defendant to testify).
114. See United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that
imprecision in indictment rendered review of materiality impossible); United States v. Slawik, 548
F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1977). But see United States v. Cole, 784 F.2d 1225, 1227 (4th Cir. 1986)
(noting that perjury indictments that alleged quoted testimony was perjurious without disclosing
nature of grand jury proceedings or how testimony was material were sufficient); United States v.
Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1983) (deciding that indictment does not require perjured
testimony's exact words; testimony's substance suffices); United States v. Stassi, 401 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1968) (determining that it is not essential that all testimony in indictment be false), rev'd on
other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1968); United States v. Weiss, 579 F.Supp. 1224, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (finding that indictment sufficiently alleged manner in which grand jury deemed answers
false).
The indictment's defects may also engender a duplicity and multiplicity defense. Indictments
cannot be dismissed as multiplicitous (where an offense is charged in multiple counts) or duplicitous
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including the "perjury trap""' where the prosecution deliberately uses judicial
proceedings to secure perjured testimony," 6 selective enforcement," 7
vindictiveness,"" and ambiguous questions.1 1 9
Further, a successful

(where multiple crimes are charged in one count) provided each count requires different evidence
to establish a distinct offense. See United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 962-63 (1lth Cir. 1986)
(explaining that indictment's three counts not multiplicitous or duplicitous because each required
different evidence to establish crime); United States v. Lazaros, 480 F.2d 174, 179 (6th Cir. 1973)
(reversing conviction on perjury counts that did not state separate offenses); Gebhard v. United
States, 422 F.2d 281, 290 (9th Cir. 1970) (reversing conviction on six of fifteen counts based on
repeated and rephrased questions), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). But see United States v.
Davis, 548 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding duplicitous count, but sentence for all counts not
exceeding maximum allowable for a single count). To challenge the indictment's sufficiency, the
defendant should move to withdraw the allegedly insufficient counts. United States v. Lighte, 782
F.2d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that defendant moved to withdraw insufficient counts).
115. For a discussion of the 'perjury trap," see Bennett L. Gershman, The "PerjuryTrap," 129
U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1981) (analyzing the boundaries of legitimate grand jury interrogation and
formulating guidelines that balance investigative process' needs and witnesses' rights).
116. In United States v. Simone, 627 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1986) the declarant, Robert
Simone, asserted the perjury trap defense and also alleged he was a selective prosecution victim.
United States v. Simone, 627 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (D.N.J. 1986). The court held that the answers
.were not induced by governmental tactics or procedures so inherently unfair . . . as to constitute
a prosecution for perjury in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at
1269-72. The questions put to Simone directly related to the question that was before the court.
Id. at 1272. The court concluded that, having lied under oath, Simone could not be insulated from
a perjury charge "solely because he said what the government anticipated he would say." Id. at
1271. The district court found that the government would have jeopardized an ongoing criminal
investigation and perhaps undercover witnesses' lives if it disclosed that it had information contrary
to the defendant's testimony. Id.
See United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that defendants
claimed government brought them before grand jury exclusively to extract perjured testimony);
United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 332 n.8 (8th Cir.) (findings of prosecutorial misconduct
unsupported by facts; no entrapment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); United States v. Caputo,
633 F. Supp. 1479, 1486-87 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting that defendants asserted prosecutor
intentionally extracted statements known to be false; government may call witness with expectation
he may commit perjury, but it may not call witness for purpose of securing perjury indictment),
rev'd on other grounds, 825 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Taylor, 881 F.2d
840 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize "perjury trap" doctrine).
117. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir.) (explaining that to prevail on
discriminatory prosecution claim, appellant must show others similarly situated not prosecuted for
similar conduct and selection based on impermissible ground), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978).
118. See United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding presumption
of vindictiveness when facts indicate no perjury indictment would have been brought had defendant
not been acquitted); cf. United States v. Godwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982) (applying vindictiveness
presumption only in cases where "reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness" exists).
119. See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that questions
may be so vague as to preclude perjury conviction for responses).
Also, a subsequent perjury charge is collaterally estopped where a defendant has been
acquitted, and the jury must have believed the defendant's story to acquit. See United States v.
Sarno, 596 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that when issues in perjury indictment
determined adversely to government in prior case, defendant entitled to dismissal on basis of
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constitutional defense might exist where the sixth amendment right to speedy
trial is promptly asserted and the prosecution delays seeking a trial for
20
perjury.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the failure to provide Miranda
warnings in grand jury proceedings is not a perjury defense.12' Likewise, a
grant of federal immunity"= is not a shield against a subsequent perjury
prosecution."n
In United States v. Apfelbaum,' 4 a witness was granted
immunity and later convicted of making false statements while testifying. The
Court held that neither the immunity statute involved"s nor the Fifth

collateral eatoppel and doublejeopardy); United States v. Robinson, 418 F. Supp. 121, 126 (D. Md.
1976) (barring government from basing perjury count on defendant's testimony that jury in prior
case must have believed to reach verdict); but see United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 64-65
(1951) (explaining that acquittal no bar to perjury charge for trial testimony when such testimony
not substantively related to crime charged); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 155 (5th Cir.
1980) (finding no pejury indictment for taking money to defraud not necessarily decided by acquittal
at first mail fraud); United States v. Woodward, 482 F. Supp. 953, 954 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (finding
no double jeopardy problem because defendant's acquittal of criminal charges does not preclude
subsequent perjury prosecution).
Denial of the defendant's right to show bias during cross-examination may be a basis for
reversing the conviction. See United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(denying right to show bias on cross-examination reverses a perjury conviction if (1) there is an
affirmative assertion and (2) judge knowingly decided to limit or deny right), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
817 (1985).
120. See United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1545 (1 Ith Cir. 1986) (explaining that where
defendant did not assert right to speedy trial and prosecution made reasonable efforts to try case,
seven year delay between trial and indictment did not violate Sixth Amendment).
121. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that
Mirandawarnings are not required when testifying before grand jury; perjured testimony will not
be suppressed for lack of warning); see United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1983)
(noting that target witness under oath deserves neither Miranda nor additional perjury warnings);
United States v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir.) (deciding that failure to give Miranda
warnings did not bar perjury prosecution for perjury before grandjury), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088
(1974), reh. denied, 420 U.S. 939 (1975).
The Court reasoned that a significant difference exists between grand jury testimony and a
police interrogation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). The witness was not
forced to incriminate himself; fifth amendment rights are recognized in the grand jury. Id. at 581.
Perjury is not a permissible substitute for invoking the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 584; United States
v. Smith, 538 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1976) (failing to suppress statements although no Miranda
warning given).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
123. Glickstien v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911) (explaining that defendant granted
immunity under bankruptcy statute had no license to commit perjury).
124. 405 U.S. 115 (1980).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
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Amendment allows a witness to commit pejury under a grant of immunity."2
Additionally, the declarant's fifth amendment right to indictment by an unbiased
grand jury is not violated if she is indicted before the same grand jury before
which she allegedly made the false statements."V The Supreme Court has also
held that an attorney's refusal to cooperate with an accused in presenting
perjured testimony at trial does not violate the accused's sixth amendment right
to assistance of counsel."n
Other unsuccessful defenses include failure to warn of contrary
evidence,'" lack of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings," 3 failure by the
investigating body to establish a crime's existence, 3' and incarceration of the
declarant.' 32
Additionally, the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination,133 the failure to specify precisely the alleged perjury,) double

126. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); accord Daniels v. United States, 196
F. 459, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1912) (explaining that immunity under bankruptcy statute applied only to
crimes committed prior to testimony, not to false statements in bankrupt's examination); Edelstein
v. United States, 149 F. 636, 642-44 (8th Cir. 1906) (convicting defendant of making false
statements under bankruptcy statute unprotected by immunity attached to bankruptcy).
127. See United States v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
defendant not denied fifth amendment rights because it is assumed jurors did not violate their oath,
although the same grand jury indicted him for allegedly committed perjury before).
128. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); see United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266,
1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining that conviction may be reversed for denial of right to show
bias on cross-examination if that right is asserted and judge knowingly decided to deny it); Carol
T. Rieger, Client Perjury,A ProposedResolution ofthe Constitutionaland EthicalIssues, 70 MINN.
L. REv. 121 (1985) (examining counsel's options when faced with client who decides to commit
perjury).
129. See United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1018 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.1975).
130. See United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 1973) (explaining that
lack of representation by counsel at habeas corpus proceeding did not justify making obviously
untrue statements under oath).
131. See United States v. Provinzano, 333 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (explaining that
it is no defense that investigating body that heard allegedly false statements did not establish crime's
existence).
132. See Credille v. United States, 354 F.2d 652, 653 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding no defense
where defendant is convicted person serving sentence).
133. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 661 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1981) (available in LEXIS,
Genfed library) (explaining that privilege against self-incrimination unavailable in testimony before
grand jury because of asserted fear of prosecution for perjury); United States v. Orta, 253 F.2d 312,
314 (5th Cir. 1958) (noting that witness has option of telling truth or remaining silent; he may not,
though uninformed of rights, commit perjury and then claim constitutional protection).
134. See United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that indictment
sufficient that set out allegations in substance and fairly informed defendant of charges against him).
See also United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1983) (dismissing requirement
when government cannot prove testimony is anything more than incomplete and evasive).
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jeopardy,13 5 and indictment by a subsequent grand jury upon discovery of false
testimony after the original proceeding" are unsuccessful defenses. Finally,
a crime's illegally seized evidence may be admitted in the prosecution of perjury
committed during the original trial. 13 7 Although non-statutory defenses are
recognized, the statutory defense of retraction remains the most significant
difference between the two federal perjury statutes.
C. Differences Between the Statutes
Section 1621, entitled "Perjury Generally," codifies common law
perjury' in expansively applying the offense to false statements made under
oath before a "competent tribunal, officer or person. ""' 9 Section 1623 limits
perjury's definition to false statements made "in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States."" 4 Thus, the
threshold standard for application of section 1623 is that it applies only to
statements made in proceedings at least as formal as a deposition. 4'
Congress adopted section 1623 as part of the 1970 Organized Crime
Control Act to expand section 1621's scope and to increase the reliability of
testimony before federal courts."G Although section 1621 defines perjury

135. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (explaining that where there is no
identity of offenses, falsely claiming innocence may be prosecuted without committing double
jeopardy).
136. See United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1238-39 (2d Cir. 1983)
(explaining that if prosecutor does not discover grand jury witness committed perjury until grand
jury disbanded, another grand jury can indict witness for perjury), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971
(1984).
137. See United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 845 (lst Cir. 1983). The defendant in
FInucan was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and tacking motor vehicle odometers.
Id. at 840. The state executed an invalid search warrant at defendant's residence. Id. at 841.
Subsequently, the defendant committed perjury before a grand jury and was charged with violating
§ 1623. Id. at 840. The court suppressed the evidence regarding the conspiracy and odometer
tampering charges. However, the court admitted the evidence for the perjury charges, reasoning
that "admission.. . will ordinarily have tittle if any impact on the exclusionary." Id. at 845. The
court favorably cited similar rulings from three other circuits. Id. See United States v. Paepke, 550
FP2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862 (1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
138. Statutes proscribing perjury have remained virtually unchanged since the first perjury
statute was enacted in 1790. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 18, 1 Star. 116.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
141. See Dunnv. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 111-12 (1979) (explaining that § 1623 does not
include sworn statement in interview with attorney).
142. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IV, 84 Stat. 922
(detailing statutory elements and penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 false declarations).
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more broadly than section 1623,1 3 section 1621 only covers "any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by [the declarant]
subscribed."'"
Section 1623, however, includes "any other information,
including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material" the
declarant uses. "'

Section 1623 defines intent as requiring knowledge,'
in contrast to
section 1621's willfulness requirement. 47 Congress made section 1623's mens
rea "knowingly" rather than "willfully" in order to ease the prosecution's
burden. Also, the two witness rule is intended to prevent convictions for
perjury based solely on one person's word.'" Section 1621 prosecutions are
held to the "two-witness" evidentiary rule, 49 whereas section 1623
prosecutions are not. ° In abolishing the two witness rule's requirement for
section 1623 prosecutions, the drafters specifically intended to make convictions
easier to obtain.'
Thus, section 1623's drafters intended that section to serve

143. For general discussions regarding the statutes' different treatment of written materials, see
Gillen et al.,
supra note 2, at 620; William G. Kiesling, Project, Fourth Survey of Wite Collar
Crime: Perjury, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 639, 640 (1987).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
146. See United States v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that §
1623 does not require specific intent to impede administration of justice by means of false
statement); United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that mere
knowledge of falsity of declaration sufficed to satisfy § 1623).
147. Under § 1621 perjury occurs when the declarant "states or subscribes [to] any material
matter which he does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1621's "two-witness" rule provides that perjury must be proved by either two
witnesses' sworn testimony or a single witness' sworn testimony corroborated by independent
evidence. United States v. Nessanbaum, 205 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 1953) (citing United States v.
Palese, 133 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1943)).
149. See United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that evidence of
three independent witnesses, corroborated by fourth witness satisfied two witness rule and sufficient
for perjury conviction), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657
(6th Cir. 1977) (noting that perjury conviction based on defendant's admission did not violate two
witness rule's spirit), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); United States v. Haldemen, 559 F.2d 31,
97 n. 185 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining two witness rule's requirements) United States v. DeLeon,
474 F.2d 790, 791 (5th Cir.) (deciding that rebuttal of defendant's testimony by police officer and
traffic ticket satisfied two witness rule), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 853 (1973); United States v.
Haggarty, 388 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1968) (determining that two witness rule allowed witness and
tape recording to show falsity of defendant's testimony).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) eliminates the two witness rule by stating that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt will satisfy the section's requirements and no particular number of witnesses is
needed to establish the necessary proof. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1988). See United States v.
Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973) (invalidating defendant's argument that § 1623's
removal of two witness rule violates Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, because the rule is
not of "constitutional dimension").
151. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48 (discussing congressional intent in passing §
1623).
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as a stronger deterrence to perjury by making perjury convictions more
likely.

52

1

Section 1623, unlike section 1621, encompasses a declarant's inconsistent
statements.1 53
In section 1623 inconsistent-statement prosecutions, the
government is not required to prove which statement is false. " Further,
section 1621's maximum penalty for convictions is a $2,000 fine and five years
imprisonment, 155 whereas section 1623's maximum penalty is a $10,000 fine
or five years imprisonment, or both." This difference reflects the Supreme
Court's adoption of the English common law view that punishment for perjury
should not be so severe that potential witnesses are discouraged from
testifying. 157
A false statement's retraction may preclude section 1623 prosecution, but
not section 1621 prosecution." By permitting a perjurer to retract, Congress
intended that the interest of truth-telling be advanced, but also recognized the
persistent danger of reducing perjury's deterrent effect with respect to truthtelling. 59 Congress' effort to improve truth-telling was thus twofold. "

152. United States v. Roche, No. 91-595-13, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *17 (E.D. Pa.
June 5, 1992).
153. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greentree), 644 F.2d 348, 348-50 (5th Cir. 1981).
154. Id.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
157. Brontaon v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1973).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (d) in pertinent part provides:
Where... the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such
admission shall bar prosecution under this section, if, at the time the admission is made,
the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become
manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988); see United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding retraction unavailable where defendant failed to retract before evident falsity would be
exposed).
The circuit courts treat the allocation of burdens under the retraction defense differently. The
Ninth Circuit requires the prosecution to "prove the inapplicability of recantation beyond a
reasonable doubt" once the defendant raises it as an affirmative defense. United States v. Tobias,
863 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, in the District of Columbia the defendant must
prove the retraction. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1044 (D.C. Dir. 1979).
At least three circuit courts have held that a defendant's implicit knowledge of the statement's
falsity does not suffice for § 1623(d) retraction defense purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias,
863 F.2d at 689 (requiring defendant to "unequivocally repudiate. . . prior testimony" to satisfy
§ 1623 (d)); United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding no effective
retraction where defendant did not specifically state any of testimony was false); United States v.
D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that defendant must make outright
retraction and repudiation of false testimony).
159. United States v. Roche, No. 91-595-13, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
June 5, 1992).
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First, Congress magnified criminal law's deterrent role by easing the
government's path to perjury convictions."" Congress emphasized creating
an incentive for the witness to speak the truth at all times."' Second,
Congress extended absolution to perjurers who retract under prescribed
conditions to secure truth through correction of previously false testimony."'
Thus, retraction is "at the fulcrum of a delicate balance."'"
The interplay between sections 1621 and 1623, with their differing
penalties,'" has stimulated debate over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
in determining the appropriate statute under which to charge a defendant."
The government maintains that prosecutors have discretion to choose either
statute.167 Defendants argue, however, that Congress intended using section
1623 for perjury proceedings in all possible cases." Courts have questioned
whether Congress intended to give prosecutors such wide discretion." 9
However, courts to date have left the issue unresolved." 7 Although courts
have called attention to the current abuses of the perjury statutes, a detailed
analysis of the problematic areas is necessary to understand the need for a single
perjury statute.

160. Id. (discussing United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
161. Id. at 11-12.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 12.
165. See text accompanying supra notes 155-64.
166. See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1979) (reversing defendant's §
1623 conviction because indictment failed to allege perjury in ancillary proceedings and noting that
§ 1621 would have applied if charged); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir.)
(explaining that defendant's § 1621 charge was abuse of prosecutorial discretion denying defendant
complete defense under § 1623), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); United States v. Kahn, 472
F.2d at 283-84 (dictum) (noting no impropriety in § 1621 charge rather than § 1623 charge because
substantive elements are same even though retraction defense unavailable).
167. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir.) (arguing prosecutor had discretion
to choose section under which to try alleged perjurer), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
168. See United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir.) (arguing that Congress
intended utilization of § 1623 for all perjury proceedings involving grand jury testimony), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
169. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283-84 (2d Cir.) (refusing to decide issue
because defendant not prejudiced), cert. denied 411 U.S. 982 (1973). Kahn, however, questioned
if Congress intended to give such wide discretion in choosing the charge and level of proof needed
to convict. Id.
170. United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937
(1977). Swainson did not reach this issue because it was raised incorrectly in a post-trial motion.
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IV. PROBLEMATIC AREAS OF THE PERJURY STATUTES
A. Discourages Rather than Encourages Truthful Testimony
Although courts have addressed the current inadequacies of the federal
perjury statutes, these problematic areas should be analyzed in-depth before a
single perjury statute that resolves these inadequacies is proposed. Section
1623(d) provides a limited defense to prosecution where the declarant retracts
false testimony.17' Two conditions must be adhered to for a successful
retraction.'
First, the declarant may retract only when the original
Second, the
"declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding.""
declarant must retract before "it has become manifest ... such falsity has been
or will be exposed."174

Congress' goal in enacting section 1623(d) was to encourage truth-telling
In enacting section 1623, Congress
to the maximum extent possible. "
emphasized truth-telling at every step of a witness' testimony. 76 As the
House Report states, the limited retraction provision induces truthful testimony
"by permitting [the witness] voluntarily to correct a false statement without
incurring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so."" Thus, Congress provided
a limited retraction defense to encourage truthful testimony, not to confer a boon
on the perjurer who frustrates a judicial investigation or who retracts only when
confronted with certain exposure."

171. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988).
172. For cases explaining the heavy burden a declarant must overcome to successfully retract
untrue statements, see United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v. Roche, No. 91-595-13, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9062, at **7-8 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1992).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. The House Committee on the Judiciary reported, retraction "serves as an inducement to
give truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring
the risk [of] prosecution by doing so." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48. See also 116 CONo.
REC. 589 (1970) (Senator McClellan's remarks) ("Mitle IV encourages truth . .. by encouraging
the correction of testimony without fear of prosecution."); Id. at 35196 (Representative Celler's
remarks) ("[i]n order to encourage truthful testimony, the title, as amended, permits recantation to
be a bar to a false declaration in certain circumstances"); Id. at 35292 (Representative Poft's
remarks) ("[t]his provision encourages the witness to correct a false statement by permitting him to
do so without incurring the risk of prosecution based on inconsistent statements").
176. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48.
177. Id.
178. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that
Congress did not countenance in § 1623(d) the injustice that would result if a witness lied to a
judicial tribunal and then, upon learning that the lie was discovered, retracted to bar prosecution),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
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By enacting section 1623, Congress changed existing case law by providing
a limited opportunity for the perjurer to correct testimony without fear of
criminal conviction."7 Congressional effort to improve truth-telling in judicial
proceedings was thus twofold. s First, Congress magnified criminal law's
Congress emphasized
deterrent role by easing the path to conviction.
encouraging the witness always to speak truthfully.'
Second, Congress
extended absolution to perjurers who retract under prescribed conditions, to
secure truth through the correction of previously false testimony." s
The current status of the perjury statutes discourages a primary
congressional purpose:
the encouragement of truthful testimony by
witnesses."' 3 Because a successful section 1623 retraction does not preclude
section 1621 prosecution,"s a declarant could adhere to section 1623's strict
provisions and further the truth-telling process,"u but nevertheless be
convicted of section 1621 perjury. Thus, the current scheme frustrates
Congress' emphasis because a witness will be hesitant to retract, knowing
section 1621 prosecution is available.
A single perjury statute would solve the problem that section 1623 sought

179. Compare § 1623 with the Supreme Court's 1937 rejection of the defense. The Court, per
Justice Roberts, reasoned:
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetuation well may affect the dearest concerns
of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes
the crime of perjury and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been
made. It is argued that to allow retraction of perjured testimony promotes the discovery
of the truth and, if made before the proceeding is concluded, can do no harm to the
parties. The argument overlooks the tendency of such a view to encourage false
swearing in the belief that if the falsity be not discovered before the end of the hearing
it will have its intended effect, but if discovered, the witness may purge himself of crime
by resuming his role as witness and substituting the truth for his previous falsehood.
It ignores the fact that the oath administered to the witness calls on him freely to
disclose the truth in the first instance and not put the court and the parties to the
disadvantage, hindrance and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross
examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral means.
United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937). In United States v. Dennison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.
1981), the court explained that § 1623(d) changed the common law rule that retraction is not a
defense to pejury.
180. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (interpreting § 1623's
legislative intent), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 954 (1980).
184. See Project, Third Annual Survey of While Collar Crime: Perjury,22 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
270, 466-67 (1984) [hereinafter Perjury Survey].
185. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 954 (1980).
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to eliminate, but instead intensified. Such a statute should incorporate section
1623's legislative concerns and maintain section 1621's spirit. 6 Further, a
single statute would necessarily include a limited retraction defense, keeping
intact the Supreme Court's fears in United States v. Norris'" and section
1623's ambitious-but realistic-goals. "s
If the perjury statutes remain unchanged, the scales of justice will tip
against a defendant who retracts a harmless statement and undermine the entire
judicial process' primary goals-the furtherance of truth in judicial proceedings.
Consequently, until a single statute is adopted to eliminate the current problems,
congressional intent and the entire judicial process' purposes will be frustrated.
Thus, in addition to encouraging truthful testimony, a single statute is needed
because, as the next Section establishes, the current status of the perjury statutes
is also hindering the judicial process' truth finding goals.
B. Section 1621 's Current Liability Hinders the JudicialProcess'
Truth-Finding Goals
Section 1621 represents the common law belief that "perjury can not be
purged," '" because "the crime is complete when a witness' statement has
once been made.""' 0 Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code drafters long ago
proposed a retraction defense, recognizing the importance of providing an
"incentive to correcting falsehoods." 19' Similarly, section 1623 and numerous
state criminal codes have acknowledged a retraction defense's benefits." 9
Imposing perjury liability is essential because it enhances the judicial
process' primary goal by increasing "the ability of an investigating body to learn

186. A suggested approach and model statute is included and explained in section V of this
note, infra.
187. The Court rejected the retraction defense, fearing the defense might encourage a witness
to swear falsely in the belief that if the falsity were discovered, the witness might avoid punishment
by belatedly telling the truth. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
188. The proposed statute satisfies Norris' fears and adheres to legislative intent by making
retraction available only if the testimony has not affected the proceeding and it is not manifest that
the falsity will be exposed. Thus, where the declarant comes forth after exposure, or under threat
of imminent exposure, the narrow retraction defense will not preclude prosecution for perjury.
189. See generally Alan G. Kimbrell, CrimesAgainst the Public, 38 Mo. L. REv. 571, 585-86
(1973) (discussing the policy considerations around the social desirability of a retraction defense in
perjury cases).
190. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937); see Jay K. Goldberg, Note, The
Ciminal Code Reform Bill of 1978 and the Peril ofFalseStatements, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 573,
582 (1979).
191. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20 comment at 129 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
192. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988).
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the truth."'" A limited defense is also a valuable aid in encouraging the
correction of misstatements." 9 Consequently, a conditional defense fosters the
same goals as the imposition of liability. Nevertheless, unless the current
inadequacies of the pejury statutes are corrected so that a limited defense is
available, these goals will remain frustrated. A single statute that includes a
retraction defense solves this dilemma and fosters the search for truth, because
the social desirability of discovering the truth favors encouraging retraction over
punishing potentially penitent pejurers.
C. ProsecutorialCircwnvention of Legislative Intent
An underlying purpose of the perjury statutes is to encourage truthful
The House Report accompanying the 1970
testimony by witnesses.'"
Organized Crime Control Act states that section 1623(d) "serves as an
inducement to the witness to give truthful testimony by permitting him
voluntarily to correct his false statement without incurringthe risk prosecution
[sic] by doing so.""' Thus, section 1623's legislative intent is to encourage
truthful testimony before a court and grand jury.'"
Section 1621, the general perjury statute, applies to false statements under
Section 1623,
oath before "a competent tribunal, officer or person." "
however, restricts perjury to false declarations under oath "in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States." 1 " This
distinction is important because section 1623 offenses are, in essence, a sub-

category of section 1621 offenses. Thus, where perjury occurs before a court
or grand jury, prosecutors may prosecute under section 1621 rather than comply
with section 1623's legislative intent.'

193. 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws 365, 666 (1970).
194. Jerold H. Israel, 7he Processof Penal Law Reform-A Look at the ProposedMichigan
Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 773, 808 n.200 (1968).
195. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
954 (1980).
196. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48 (emphasis added).
197. Id. See also supra note 175.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
200. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that § 1623, which
applies only to grand jury proceedings, did not replace § 1621 and that the substantive elements for
perjury are the "same under either statute"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
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A defendant cannot remedy section 1621 perjury by retracting."1 In
contrast, retraction may bar section 1623 prosecution subject to four
conditions.'
Compliance with section 1623's strict retraction requirements,
however, does not preclude section 1621 prosecution.'
Consequently, a
perjurer who desires to admit the statement's falsity before a court or grand
jury, invoking section 1623(d)'s narrow defense, may be prosecuted under
section 1621. Thus, prosecutors can disregard legislative intent by manipulating
the perjury statutes to place perjurers in the most disadvantageous trial position.
Circuit courts question such tactics, recognizing that, although Congress
constitutionally could have granted prosecutors such wide discretion, legislative
history supports the contrary.'
In United States v. Kahn,' the Second
Circuit-addressing but not deciding this problem-found it "disturbing the
prospect of the government employing section 1621 whenever a retraction exists,
and section 1623 when one does not, simply to place perjury defendants in the
most disadvantageous trial position. ""
Courts are rendered helpless,
however, because of the exact wording of the perjury statutes. Until these
inadequacies receive legislative attention, the concerns expressed by the court
in Kahn will endure. Thus, section 1623 and its commendable legislative efforts
will remain meaningless and will be ignored if prosecutors charge perjurers
under section 1621, when section 1623's narrow retraction defense would bar
such unnecessary prosecution.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTION:

A SINGLE PERJURY STATUTE

Congress enacted section 1623 and its limited retraction defense for use in
perjury prosecutions before a court or grand jury. Presently, this conditional
defense is ignored because a declarant who utters a false statement before a
court or grand jury, but subsequently retracts pursuant to section 1623(d)'s
requirements, may nevertheless be prosecuted under section 1621.
Consequently, a declarant has no incentive to correct a false declaration despite
Congress' desire to encourage such corrections without fear of prosecution.
Congress should enact the following perjury statute that encourages a declarant
to correct a false statement occurring before a court or grand jury.

201. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 573 (1937) (explaining that retraction is futile
once perjured testimony has been offered); United States v. Del Tor, 513 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir.)
(noting that prompt retraction does not excuse § 1621 perjury violation), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 826
(1975).
202. See text accompanying supra notes 104-08.
203. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
205. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
206. Id. at 283.
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(a) Whoever, under oath (or in any declaration, certificate,
verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under
section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) before any competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United
States authorizes an oath to be administered, testifies, declares, or
certifies truly, or makes any written testimony, declaration, deposition,
or certificate, subscribes, is true, knowingly makes or uses any other
information, including book, paper, document, record, recording, or
other material, knowing the same to contain any false material
declaration, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within
or outside the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section
alleging that, in any proceedings before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more
declarations, that are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is
necessarily false, need not specify which declaration is false if (1) each declaration was material to the point in question,
and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the
statute of limitations for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration
set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient
for conviction by proof that the defendant while under oath made
irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in
question before a competent tribunal, officer, or person. It shall be
a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to the first
sentence of this subsection that the defendant, at the time each
declaration was made, believed the declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding
in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration
admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar
prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made,
the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, and it has
not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
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Admission that a declaration is false does not bar prosecution under
this section where the declaration occurs under oath before competent
tribunals, officers, or persons in proceedings that do not constitute a
court or grand jury proceeding.
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is
sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be
made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or
other types of evidence unless the declaration occurs under oath before
competent tribunal, officer, or person in proceedings that do not
constitute a court or grand jury proceeding.
This proposed statute encompasses both section 1621, perjury generally,
and section 1623, perjury before or ancillary to a court or grand jury. The
statute preserves Congress' two-fold effort to improve truth-telling in judicial
proceedings.2 7 The statute magnifies criminal law's deterrent role by easing
the path to perjury convictions;' however, the statute also extends absolution
to perjurers who retract under prescribed conditions, thereby securing truth
through the correction of previously false testimony." Thus, despite altering
the current perjury statutes, the proposed statute pays particular attention to both
goals.
The proposed statute further eases the government's burden in proving
perjury convictions. Currently the government must prove that a defendant
210
willfully presented false testimony to prevail in a section 1621 prosecution.
Section 1623 eased the prosecution's heavy burden-at least regarding false
declarations before a court or grand jury-by requiring the prosecution prove
only that the declarant knowingly made a false statement. 2 ' The proposed
statute further eases the prosecution's burden by applying the easier-to-meet
"knowing" standard to all perjury prosecutions, regardless of where they occur.
Thus, under the proposed statute, the government may now prevail in settings
less formal than a court or grand jury by proving that the declarant knowingly
made a false material declaration.
The proposed statute further accommodates Congress' second goal, securing

207. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
954 (1980).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) (-[W]iilfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true .... ").
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1988) ("[Klnowingly makes any false material declaration...
knowing the same to contain any false material declaration. .. ").
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truth through the correction of false testimony and also achieves the objectives
of early perjury law as it developed in the common law. Section 1623
encourages truthful testimony by serving "as an inducement to the witness to
give truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement
without incurring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so."" 2
Currently,
however, the government may prosecute under section 1621 when faced with a
section 1623 violation.213 Because a primary reason for section 1623's
enactment was to allow perjurers a limited retraction defense, the proposed
statute better effectuates this legislative intent.
The legislative intent behind the retraction defense is incorporated into the
proposed statute because section (a), when read together with section (b), allows
for a conditional retraction defense only during a court or grand jury
proceeding. Further, in accord with section 1621's legislative intent, a
retraction defense is unavailable in settings less formal than a court or grand
jury. Thus, the legislative intent behind both statutes is finally achieved because
witnesses who commit perjury before a court or grand jury are provided a
limited opportunity to retract without fear of prosecution.214
The proposed statute solves another inadequacy found in section 1623's
retraction provision. Because section 1623(d) uses or rather than and, the
conditions to the retraction bar appear disjunctive, thus making conviction more
difficult. A grammatical reading, however, is inconsistent with Congress' intent
to provide for a conditional defense while concurrently easing the prosecution's
burden in obtaining perjury convictions. Thus, a literal reading implies that a
perjurer need only meet one of section 1623(d)'s requirements.

212. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 48.
213. See Perjury Survey, supra note 184, at 466-67.
214. This proposed statute keeps intact the spirit of, and legislative intent behind §§ 1621 and
1623. The author believes that a limited retraction defense should be available for witnesses who
testify in settings less formal than a court or grand jury because truthful testimony should always
be encouraged.
Such a statute could benefit the overburdened judicial system. For example, if a witness were
able to retract a false statement during the same deposition that the statement occurred, then the
truth-finding process would be achieved much earlier in the judicial process. Further, spurious
litigation could be avoided because witnesses will be encouraged to correct statements so that settings
as formal as a court or grand jury may never be reached. Thus, scarce judicial resources could be
conserved with such a statute as issues become resolved before formal proceedings occur.
Should Congress choose to adopt such measures, the proposed model statute could readily be
adapted to effectuate such needs. For example, section (b) could read instead:
A declarant shall not be guilty of perjury under this section if such declarant admits such
declaration to be false, retracts such false declaration in the course of the proceeding in
which such declaration was made before it became manifest that such false declaration
was or would be exposed and before such false declaration substantially affected such

proceeding.
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The proposed statute, accepting the approach adopted by courts that have
addressed the issue," 5 recognizes that section 1623(d)'s literal meaning
frustrates legislative intent. Consequently, the proposed statute's conditional
retraction defense is limited in nature. This limited defense more readily
effectuates legislative intent than the current perjury statutes. Thus, the
retraction provision is available to perjurers only if their false testimony has not
substantially affected the proceeding and it has not become manifest that the
falsity has been or will be exposed.
Currently, the legislative intent behind the federal perjury statutes is being
ignored. Although Congress created section 1623 specifically for perjury
occurring before a court or grand jury, the present status of the statutes prevents
such uses from ever occurring. Consequently, neither goal that Congress sought
to achieve-facilitating perjury convictions and encouraging truthful testimony
through a retraction defense-is being served. Sensitive both to legislative intent
and the aims of prosecutors and potentially penitent perjurers, the proposed
perjury statute solves the existing statutory inadequacies. Encouraging truthful
testimony by allowing a retraction defense, the proposed statute achieves the
purposes behind the current perjury statutes. Thus, the proposed statute
achieves the purposes behind the current perjury statutes that are being frustrated
by encouraging truthful testimony through a retraction defense.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. section 1623 to address perjury occurring
before a court or grand jury. Section 1623 includes a limited retraction defense

to encourage a declarant to correct false statements without the risk of
prosecution. Presently, however, Congress' efforts to encourage the truthfinding process are being frustrated.
Under the current status of the perjury statutes, a perjurer who complies
with section 1623's narrow retraction defense may nonetheless be prosecuted for
perjury under section 1621, the general perjury statute. Consequently, because
of the current inadequacies of the perjury statutes, Congress' intent is being
circumvented. This Note's proposed statute solves the inadequacies present in
the federal perjury statutes by easing the government's path to prosecution and
by encouraging truthful testimony through a limited retraction defense. Until

215. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding that despite
literal reading, clear legislative intent required the use of or), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 954 (1980);
United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, 177 (D.D.C. 1974) (deciding that failure to satisfy one
condition of § 1623(d) makes the retraction defense inapplicable). In Kramer v. United States, 434
U.S. 961 (1977), the Court left open the questionwhether § 1623(d)'s prerequisites were to be given
a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation.
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such a single statute is adopted, the lofty purposes behind section 1623's
enactment will never be achieved.
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